II . A S LEEPING G IANT A WAKENS: T HE D ORMANT C OMMERCE C LAUSE AND THE P RACTICAL E FFECTS OF P RIOR

I NTRODUCTION
If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.
-John Fitzgerald Kennedy1
Summum ius summa iniuria.
-Cicero2
* The author wishes to dedicate this Note to the late Dr. David McKillop -a professor, mentor, and friend. His life's work lives on in the deeds of his students.
The political outcry over prescription drug costs has been one of the most vociferous in recent memory. From tales depicting renegade seniors sneaking cheap prescriptions of Vioxx out of Tijuana across the border,3 to the promises of reduced prices made by front-runners during the 2000 Presidential election,4 the calls for lower drug prices have been forceful and demanding. This war for lower-priced pharma ceuticals fought by consumers, interest groups and politicians against the pharmaceutical industry itself has recently developed yet another front. The latest battle is over Medicaid.5 The new victims are the poor.
Presently, federal statutory provisions in the Medicaid program provide relief from high drug prices through a mandatory rebate mechanism.6 Federal law requires pharmaceutical manufacturers to rebate their drugs sold to Medicaid recipients at a minimum level of 15.1 percent of the average manufacturer's price of those drugs.7 In addition to the mandatory rebate, federal law provides for the discre tionary provision of prior authorization by which the states may serve the best interests of their Medicaid recipients in a cost-effective man ner.8 The federal Medicaid program allows states to condition pre scription of a covered drug on special prior authorization of that drug with a state official.9 Both the mandatory rebate and prior authoriza tion provisions serve to balance access and cost in' an attempt to pro vide necessary care for the indigent.10
In the face of mounting pressure over rising drug prices, several states sought to expand the federal rebate and prior authorization 9. For example, a state could declare Rogaine subject to prior authorization. As a con sequence of this designation, any time a physician prescribed Rogaine she would have to make a telephone request to a state commission. Only after permission by the commission could the drug be prescribed. Vol. 101:602 provisions in order to ft�rther reduce pharmaceutical prices for Medi caid beneficiaries.11 The most legally controversial of these state pro grams has been the "Maine Rx Program" ("Maine Program").12 Under the Maine Program, the Commissioner of the Maine Department of Human Services negotiates to obtain rebates above and beyond those required by federal law with pharmaceutical manufacturers.13 Al though these rebates are voluntary, those non-compliant manufactur ers are subject to prior authorization f o r their particular non complying drugs.14 Thus, Maine in effect uses the prior authorization as an incentive or a leverage device for extracting supplemental re bates from manufacturers for its citizens. 15 With the advent of the Maine Program in May 2000, controversy ensued. The Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America ("PhRMA") quickly fi led suit in the District Court of Maine16 arguing:
(1) the prior authorization provision was preempted by federal Medi caid law; and (2) the mandatory rebate provision was an extraterrito rial regulation in violation of the dormant commerce clause of the Constitution.17 PhRMA asserted that the use of prior authorization as 13. See Joan Henneberry, Addendum to State Pharmaceutical Assistance Programs: The Maine Rx Program, at www.nga.org/center/divisions/1,1188,C_ISSUE_BRIEF11D_2287,00. html (Aug. 3, 2001 ).
14. Id. 15. In addition to the rebate and prior authorization provisions, the Maine Program also contained another controversial element. The Maine Program prohibited unconscionable prices and unreasonable profits by manufacturers. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2697(2) (West 2001 ) . This outrageous provision, however, was immediately deemed an unconstitu tional regulation of out-of-state manufacturers' revenues in violation of the dormant com merce clause. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Comm'r, Me. Dep't of Human Serv. , No. 00-157-B-H, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *4-5 (D. Me. Oct. 26, 2000) [hereinafter Commissioner]. This provision is not discussed in the course of this Note for two reasons. First, extraterritoriality will be analyzed extensively in the course of the discussion on the rebate provision. That extraterritorial analysis can be cross-applied to the unreasonable profit provision. Second, the state of Maine never appealed the District Court's ruling on this issue. Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 72 n.2 (1st Cir. 2001) . Therefore, it is unlikely that other states will use the illegal profiting provision in enacting any similar price reduction Medicaid programs. As a result, the provision does not have the appeal of general application to warrant extensive discussion.
16. Commissioner, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17363, at *4. 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3: "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Com merce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." The dormant commerce clause is in effect a "negative" Commerce Clause prohibiting states from interfering with interstate commerce in the absence of congressional regulation. See Letter from James Madison to J.C. Cabell (Feb. 13, 1829), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 478 (M. Farrand ed., 1937) (noting that the Commerce Clause a leverage device ran contrary to the clear congressional intent limit ing the use of prior authorization to curbing over-prescription of un necessary medication.18 Therefore, PhRMA contended, federal Medi caid law governing prior authorization and the congressional intent behind that provision should preempt the Maine Program. PhRMA also argued that the supplemental state rebate provision under the Maine Program unconstitutionally regulated transactions between manufacturers and wholesalers that took place wholly out-of-state. The Maine Program presents a novel method for dealing with high prescription drug prices for Medicaid recipients and the public at large. Due to the potential of such a programs to cut Medicaid costs, other states have watched and continue to follow closely the litigation over the Maine Program as they attempt to formulate similar stat utes.24 Thus, the legality of the Maine Program may be of great conse quence for many states and their strategies in combating escalating pharmaceutical prices.25 Since the Maine Program and other similar "was intended as a negative and preventive provision against injustice among the States themselves, rather than as a power to be used f o r the positive purpose of the General Gov ernment .... "). For an example of the Supreme Court's first major encounter in developing the doctrine, see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824 30. Express preemption occurs where there is explicit preemptive language by Congress to take exclusive control of a certain field. Gade v. Nat'I Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) .
31. Implied field preemption occurs where the entire federal regulatory framework is "so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) .
32. Implied conflict preemption takes place, in the absence of express preemptive lan guage, either where congressional intent dictates that "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility," Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) , or where such intent demonstrates that the state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941 ).
33. Federal law does not expressly prohibit states from enacting prior authorization and additional rebate laws. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-8 (West 2000 ) . Therefore, express preemp-Since the conflict is implicit in implied conflict cases, ascertainment of congressional intent is of paramount importance in assessing these claims.34 A mere fragment or a strained inference depicting congres sional intent is not enough to preempt a state law.35 The presumption is against preemption,36 and only when congressional intent is shown to be "clear and manifest" will that presumption be rebutted and pre emption found.37
Due to the integral role of congressional intent in implied conflict preemption cases, the interpretive devices used to ascertain intent may be crucial to the discovery of Congress's clear and manifest purposes. Consequently, whether a judge is committed to a textualist or a pur posive paradigmatic framework38 may result in the use of widely varying legislative materials and ultimately result in different findings regarding preemption.39 Similarly, the nature of the statute involved may lend guidance as to the discovery of true congressional intent and a finding for preemption.4° For example, in the case of Medicaid, the statute embodies a delicate balance of compromises between medical professionals, patients, manufacturers, federal legislators, and state in terests.41 Therefore, identifying the inherent nature of the statute at tion does not apply. Additionally, Medicaid is a joint federal-state program. See MARK R. DANIELS, Introduction: The Inconsistency and Paradox of American Health Care, in MEDICAID REFORM AND THE AMERICAN STA TES 3 (Mark R. Daniels ed., 1998). Therefore field preemption is not the appropriate category as the states occupy a very large part of the Medicaid regulatory scheme. Thus, the relevant preemption category is one of implied con flict -whether the state prior authorization statutes stand as obstacles to the accomplish ment and execution of the full congressional purposes and objectives behind Medicaid. The First Circuit also recognized that only implied conflict preemption was at stake in assessing the Maine Program. The court stated: "There is no explicit language in the Medicaid statute that forbids the Maine Rx Program. Nor is the doctrine of 'field' preemption relevant, as Medicaid is a cooperative federal and state program .... Therefore, we consider only im plied conflict preemption as a basis for PhRMA's argument." Pharm. 45. Laws that regulate commerce by facially treating in-slaters and out-of-staters alike are held to the lowest level of scrutiny -the balancing test. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970) . Under the balancing test, the burdens imposed by the state law on commerce are weighed against its benefits. Id. If those burdens are clearly excessive in con trast to the putative local benefits, then the law is struck down in violation of the dormant commerce clause. Id.
In applying a balancing test to a state statute, due to the broad discretion of the test, it is crucial to place the appropriate items in the balance. In addition to traditional items regard ing effects on commerce, judicial concerns and ideals behind dormant commerce clause the ory m ay serve to tip the balance. Such judicial concerns vary, but include, among other things, interpreting statutes to guard against protectionism, or to encourage national uni formity, or to advance the interests of vulnerable minorities. See generally Regan, supra note 42 (discussing judicial concerns within the rubric of the dormant commerce clause). These concerns may be as weighty as the effects on commerce.
ancing test.46 This Note concludes that state prior authorization stat utes, such as the Maine Program, are unconstitutional devices that also fail to provide an appropriate remedy for high prescription drug prices.
I. TH E S TRONG M EDICINE OF P REEMPTION
In examining prior authorization statutes, such as the Maine Pro gram, the key issue in the preemption context is ascertaining congres sional intent. If the state statutes "stand[] as ... obstacle [s] " in the ac complishment of federal objectives, then courts must find such statutes preempted under implied conflict preemption standards.47 Determin ing congressional intent is not, however, an easy task. Moreover, seemingly multiple expressions of congressional intent confound and confuse the inquiry in light of varying interpretive theories.48 This Part argues that, subsequent to a court adopting a more paradigmatic and politically contextual approach in searching for congressional intent, the prior authorization statutes will be deemed to run contrary to that congressional intent and preempted by federal law. Section I.A argues that adopting a purposive interpretive theory in examining the rela tionship between the federal Medicaid statute and the state laws prop erly fulfills the judiciary1s role within the legislative process and leads to the conclusion of preemption. Section I.B argues that Medicaid is a delicate balance of compromises and that courts must find preemption in order to preserve the series of compromises that embody the fed eral legislation.
A. A Purposive Framework: The Search for Intent
The two major statutory interpretive theories that battle within the juridical theatre are textualism and intentionalism.49 A court adopting 46. The Supreme Court has, however, in the past balanced an extraterritorial statute rather than automatically deem it per se unconstitutional. See Edgar, 457 U.S. 624. There fore, it may be inappropriate to consider balancing and extraterritoriality as alternative standards. Nonetheless, many of the extraterritorial cases dispense with balancing alto gether. See supra note 44 (listing cases). Moreover, there may be a presumption against bal ancing developing on the Court. See CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., concurring) (pos iting that a balancing test is "ill suited to the judicial function and should be undertaken rarely if at all"). Vol. 101:602 a textualist approach to statutory interpretation looks to the plain meaning of the statute -usually exclusively and at the expense of the legislative history -in order to determine the legislature's intent in enacting the statute.50 Intentionalism, on the other hand, posits that contextual analysis is necessary to discern the full meaning of the stat ute's terms.51 One intentionalist model, known as purposivism, uses the context of the statute's text, legislative history, and circumstances surrounding enactment in order to discover the broad purposes em bodied in the legislation and to fit those purposes into the entire fabric of the law.52 The purposive judge operates from the premise -some times troubling to textualists and public choice scholars -that the legislature acted with a purpose.53 This Section first argues that pur posivism is the more jurisprudentially sound interpretive theory within the preemption setting54 in that it allows the judiciary to fulfill its role within the legislative process. Only by focusing on the interpretive de bate first can a court confidently venture into the ambiguities of the Medicaid statute armed with the most appropriate and powerful weapons from its paradigmatic arsenal. That is, the arguments ad vancing purposivism must be firmly established before a court can grapple with the heart of the legal controversy over prior authoriza tion.
From this interpretive starting point, this Section then directly con f ronts the difficulties of the prior authorization statutes and argues that federal law preempts the Maine Program and similar prior authorization state statutes. A critical analysis, in light of a purposive f r amework, of the Maine Program and the two related judicial opin ions concludes that the First Circuit used a myopic textual approach and failed to take into account the legislative history dealing with prior authorization and the context of other states' implementation of prior authorization in accordance with this legislative history.
The Doctrinal Fo rmulation
Purposivism provides the strongest interpretive foundation for as sessing preemption disputes. A court's adoption of a purposive ap proach is better than the utilization of a textual one in examining pre emption questions in general and Medicaid disputes in particular.55 . Purposivism allows the judiciary to fulfill its role as an active partici pant in the lawmaking process -a role especially important in the context of preemption.56 This view is based upon the Founders' belief that each branch of government is interdependent in its contribution to the deliberative and lawmaking process . es.57 This judicial role be comes of supreme importance in the preemption setting because courts are the only bodies that can properly manage federalism con cerns -the very concerns at the foundation of preemption conflicts.58 Because Congress "cannot, ex ante, draft meaningful preemption pro visions ... [and] Congress has demonstrated an inability to modify the language of preemption provisions even in light of judicial decisions pointing out textual inadequacies," then it logically follows that "Con gress is even less likely to manage federalism in the implied preemp tion context."59 Purposivism, furthermore, provides judges with the ability to go outside of the inadequacies of the text in finding legislative intent, thus better managing federalism concerns. Congress is simply unable to imagine every undesirable application of its statutory provisions in or der to evince an explicit preemptive intent.60 A purposive judge can seek guidance from legislative history and the overall context of the 55. Jordan, supra note 39, at 1192 ("[A]lthough a textual approach to statutory interpre tation may be sound in many contexts, the approach is unsatisfactory in the context of pre emption."). REV. 405, 426 (1989) (noting that "resort to purpose was an effort to maintain the role of the courts as agents of the legislature while at the same time acknowledging the in adequacy of textualism").
56
57
. See ROBERT A. KATZMANN, COURTS AND CONGRESS 1 (1997) ; JOHN E. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3.5 (5th ed. 1995) (explaining the interdependence and in termingling between the branches and refuting the notion that the three branches operate separately in compartmentalized spheres -all in culinary terms: "While people sometimes refer to the three branches of the federal government as a three-layer cake, it is more accu rate to think of it as a marble cake"); Jordan, supra note 39, at 1220. While Medicaid affords states' discretion concerning the scope of benefits and administra tion of their respective programs, the program operates under federal oversight, and the his tory of this dually administered enterprise has been one of contention between the respec tive levels of government. In particular, federal and state regulators most often disagree about funding, and over the years they have had a series of intergovernmental disputes re lated to joint financing responsibilities which have accelerated with heightened federal man dates being placed on state Medicaid programs. , 1984-1992 (1998) (describing the changing federal-state relationship within Medicaid).
See generally JEAN DONOVAN GILMAN, MEDICAID AND THE COSTS OF FEDERALISM
and nature, demands a more searching judicial inquiry designed to up hold the spirit of the law and maintain the federalism issues f o und therein. While the textualist judge would argue that the purposive ap proach only leads to judicial over-reaching and impermissible legis lating,67 such concerns are exaggerated and unwarranted in the pre emption context. The textualist judge contends that her purposivist colleague can easily abandon the statutory text in order to impute a purpose that could easily be a judicial one not envisioned by the leg islature.68 The textual approach, on the other hand, serves the ideals of judicial restraint by keeping the legislative role in the hands of Congress and not the court.69 The textual approach purports to har ness the dangers of judicial lawmaking by preventing judicial consulta tion of legislative materials and the social context of the statute.70 Al though the concern over judicial over-reaching is noteworthy, it can be eased and refuted -at least in the preemption context -in three dif f e rent ways.
First, a purposivist judge does not abandon the text, but rather looks to extra-textual materials only after finding that the text is am biguous as to the statute's purpose.71 Judicial restraint in the form of deference to the text still remains in a purposive world. Those "pur posivist" judges who seek to manipulate the text through the expan sion of interpretive factors grossly misapply purposive theory.72 These same manipulators could just as easily manipulate under the guise of rmed with an attribution of the statute's general purpose, the court can adapt the text of the statute to changing circumstances without, one assumes, too much concern for the embarrassments of specific language."); Redish & Chung, supra note 53, at 817 ("Because a purposivist judge willingly posits a reasonable legislature -an assumption that is not necessarily valid in all instances -she can hardly guarantee that the purposes she discerns represent the actual purposes of the enacting body.").
69. Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 23.
Id.
("By restricting courts to the language of the statute, textualism attempts to pre vent the creative judicial lawmaking that can occur when judges consult legislative materials and the social context of the statute.").
71. See Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 28-29 (arguing that "Hart and Sacks advocated con textual analysis as the way to resolve the ambiguities inherent in language"); Gebbia-Pinetti, supra note 61, at 284-85 (noting that a purposivist judge "first examines the statutory lan guage, because the text is the best evidence of the legislature's intent or the statute's pur pose").
72. See Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 28-29.
[Vol. 101:602 the textualist framework -albeit with fewer tools -in order to meet their purposes.73 Thus, the textualist's concerns for the primacy of the text and the prohibition against manipulation and de facto judicial legislating are still safeguarded under a purposive approach.
Second, grasping onto the face of the text without regard to the depth of congressional intent can lead to strained interpretations that are wholly inaccurate.74 It is the search for accuracy that requires in creased judicial involvement through a purposive framework. If the text is ambiguous, the purposivist judge uses legislative history and other extra-textual materials in order to interpret the statute.75 The textualist would argue against the use of such materials and would ac cept a "substantial margin of error in identifying legislative will" for the sake of restraint.76 Under the purposivist framework, "an increase in accuracy is purchased at the price of greater opportunities for judi cial policymaking."77 The trade-off between restraint and accuracy, however, is far f r om equal.
The inaccuracies of'textualism can produce contrived interpreta tions that lack coherence and are based on unnatural inferences.78 Moreover, the benefits of restraint found through the abandonment of extra-textual devices are illusory. As one legal scholar notes:
We should not insulate ourselves from the context in which legally sig nificant words were uttered if we care about ascertaining what the speaker intended to convey. Whether we see this upon our initial reading of the document (intrinsic ambiguity), or only later after we have con ducted adequate investigation (extrinsic ambiguity) is ultimately of little significance. 79 The reason that such distinctions between intrinsic and extrinsic ambi guities become seemingly irrelevant is that the introduction of context into the interpretive melting pot does not eliminate or create new in terpretations; rather context makes some interpretations "more salient and others less salient."80 Therefore, the benefits of restraint derived f rom abandoning extra-textual devices are limited and yet serve to undermine the ascertainm e nt of accurate results.
Finally, the concern over excess judicial involvement is misplaced in the preemption setting. Preemption calls for more judicial involve ment because preemption disputes can be characterized as judicial in nature insofar as they involve the allocation of authority.81 As opposed to the creation of laws for th . e regulation of conduct, preemption deals with f e deral-state relations and the potential invalidation of laws.82 Such a topic is one for judicial eyes; therefore, textualism hampers the judiciary f r om becoming involved in a realm that demands heightened judicial responsibility.
Thus, purposivism is a superior interpretive theory to textualism in preemption disputes because it allows the court to manage federalism concerns in an area of law -Medicaid -that desperately needs such management. Although the textualist judge argues for a more re strained approach in order to keep the judiciary in check, ultimately her concerns are overstated relative to purposivist theory. Moreover, the textualist judge sacrifices accuracy for limited checks on judicial over-reaching, and undermines the inherently judicial task of assessing preemption disputes.
Purposive Application: The Maine Rx Program
Application of the purposive approach to the conflict between the Maine Program and federal Medicaid law clearly demonstrates that the Maine Program must be preempted. A critical analysis of the First Circuit decision in Concannon83 demonstrates that the First Circuit ignored the clear legislative history, the subsequent state statutes, and the proposed regulations by the Health Care Financing Administra tion ("HCFA") evincing the purpose of prior authorization embodied in that history. By taking these three important factors into account, the Maine law stands as an obstacle to the execution and accomplish ment of the full purposes and obj ectives of Congress.
The statutory text of the federal Medicaid program is silent as to the situations in which prior authorization may be implemented. Fed eral Medicaid law explicitly provides for prior authorization under limited circumstances.84 The statutory language alone, however, fails [Vol. 101:602 to provide Congress's intentions as to the limitations on the use of prior authorization. Standing alone, the text might stand for the ideal that prior authorization may be implemented for any purpose.
An examination of the legislative history, however, shows that Congress had a specific and limited scope for prior authorization. The House Reports illuminate that Congress intended states only to have the option of imposing prior authorization in order to safeguard against unnecessary over-prescription of drugs and to provide for a proper balance of quality and economy.85 As the District Court of Maine noted, "It may have never occurred to Congress that the Medi caid program could be hijacked to provide leverage f or other pur poses .... Maine's Rx rebate program has nothing to do with these concerns of unnecessary use of prescription drugs or safeguarding Medicaid payments."86
In addition to the legislative history, the circumstances surround ing enactment shed insight into congressional purpose and serve to place the statute in its appropriate legal context.87 In assessing the le gal landscape, an important factor to consider is how prior authoriza tion was most commonly implemented by the states immediately after the provision was enacted in 1990. In a paper published in the early 1990s, Drs. Robert Buchanan and Scott Smith found that the "most common method used by the Medicaid programs to enforce their poliprior authorization; and ... provides for the dispensing of at least 72-hour supply of a cov ered outpatient prescription drug in an emergency situation." 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396r-
85. See H.R. REP. No. 101-881, at 98 (1990) , reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2017, 2110 ("As under current law, States would have the option of imposing prior authorization re quirements with respect to covered prescription drugs in order to safeguard against unneces sary utilization and assure that payments are consistent with efficiency, economy, and quality of care. However, the Committee does not intend that States establish or implement prior authorization controls that have the effect of preventing competent physicians from pre scribing in accordance with their medical judgment."); H.R. REP. No. 101-964 Part B (1990) ("Except in the first year following approval of a new drug, States are permitted to subject any covered outpatient drug to prior authorization. States may limit quantities of drugs, pro vided the limitations are necessary to discourage waste."). 87. The purposivist judge need not limit herself only to the text and legislative history in ascertaining the statute's purpose. Redish & Chung, supra note 53, at 816. The purposivist judge must also examine the entire "legal landscape" in order to properly interpret the stat ute in a manner consonant with the greater legal context. Id. While the text and legislative history inform the more immediate purposes of the statute by allowing glimpses into the en acting Congress's mind, the legal landscape involves assessing the dynamic legal, social and political forces that change and shape the statute into one that fits into the legal system as a whole as it develops throughout time. See HART & SACKS, supra note 49, at 1124 ("The pur pose of a statute must always be treated as including not only an immediate purpose or group of related purposes but a larger and more subtle purpose as to how the particular stat ute is to be fitted into the legal system as a whole.").
cies against off-label use is prior authorization."88 Off-label use is the practice of physicians prescribing approved medications for other than their intended indications.89 Thus, interpreting the prior authorization provision to apply only to the prevention of off-label use serves to fur ther the statute's purpose within the existing legal landscape of the early 1990s. Moreover, the use of prior authorization in the context of limiting off-label prescription -a practice that can lead to unneces sary over-prescription -fits harmoniously with the legislative his tory.90 This legal landscape created by the states in the early 1990s provides a greater context in ascertaining the statute's true purposes. This contextual framework, coupled with the legislative history, sug gests the purpose behind the prior authorization was to reduce unnec essary and inefficient over-prescription by curbing off-label use.
Finally, proposed regulations by the HCFA, the agency that once administered Medicaid,91 further paint a picture of the legislative land scape in conformity with the prior state enactments and legislative his tory. The HCF A failed to issue formal regulations regarding prior authorization.92 Yet the proposed regulations that the HFCA promul gated indicate that prior authorization should only be used to curb un necessary prescription, not to limit coverage.93 As such, the proposed regulations by the HFCA support the idea that the Maine Program should be preempted as it conflicts with federal law.94
In light of this legislative history and legal landscape, the First Circuit failed to recognize the intent underlying prior authorization. The First Circuit, in assessing the Maine Rx Program, argued that the 90. An example of the use of prior authorization as a method for controlling unneces sary prescription of off-label drugs is as follows: "state X" places minoxidil on its Medicaid formulary for the treatment of hypertension. Doctors in "state X" begin prescribing minoxi dil off-label in order to treat hair loss. "State X" subjects minoxidil to prior authorization in order to curb this off-label prescription which it believes to be unnecessary and uneconom ical in light of the allocation of funds for the most important drugs. Reg. 48,442, 48,454 (Sept. 19, 1995) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 441 and 447) (noting that states should be prevented from "using a prior authorization program as a proxy for a closed formulary").
94. See Pancoast, supra note 91, at 190.
[Vol. 101:602 Maine statute permissibly utilized prior authorization by noting that the f e deral text explicitly allowed for prior authorization and that, ab sent any textual proof to the contrary, deference must be given to the Maine Department of Human Services' application of the provision.95 The First Circuit's decision is flawed in two respects.
First, that court used a strictly textual approach in examining the preemption question and therefore ignored Congress's true purposes. As noted above, the legislative history, the proposed HCFA regula tions, and state laws established post-enactment demonstrate the nar row intentions that Congress had for prior authorization.96 The First Circuit, however, ignored the legal context and instead used the si lence of the text to make the bold conclusion that it was "not con vinced that the Medicaid statute is concerned with the motivation be hind imposing prior authorization."97 The implication of this statement is potentially disastrous. As the District Court below argued, "If Maine can use its authority over Medicaid authorization to leverage drug manufacturer rebates for the benefit of uninsured citizens, then it can just as easily put the rebates into a state program for highway and bridge construction or school funding."98 The First Circuit briefly, but insufficiently, responded to this argument, noting that highway con struction and school funding are unrelated to providing medical serv ices and, theref ore, could not be justified.99 This response is insuffi cient because the crux of the District Court's argument deals not with the latter part of its statement -the use of funds for highways and schools -but the former -the use of prior authorization as a lever age device. Because the First Circuit already indicated that the moti vations behind prior authorization are not of concern,100 presumably a state could implement a program as a leverage device against doctors, or as a tool to reduce Medicaid spending at the expense of the poor, or for any other purpose it so desired. Moreover, in addressing the latter part of the District Court's argµment, if the First Circuit only limited the use of the rebate monies to providing medical services to the needy, states still could potentially leverage drug manufacturers and use the funds not for highways but for the construction of county hos pitals or other medically-related self-dealing. This certainly was not the vision that Congress had for prior authorization.101 Second, the First Circuit's decision is incomplete in that it failed to find preemption of the state statute based on the law's conflict with Medicaid's requirement that health care be in the "best interests" of the program.102 Prior authorization as implemented by Maine runs contrary to the Medicaid provision that any state restriction on drug distribution "provide such safeguards as may be necessary to assure that ... care and services ... will be provided, in a manner consistent with ... the best interests of [Medicaid] requirements."103 The Maine Program harms Maine recipients by impeding their access to their doc tors' first-choice medications and, therefore, runs opposite to the best interests of providing medically necessary services to the poor. '04 The First Circuit did not reject this argument and only ruled against PhRMA on this point because of PhRMA's inability to sustain its bur den on this facial challenge.105 Rather, the First Circuit voiced its con cern in stating: "Since both sides agree that the prior authorization re quirement is the 'hammer' or 'force' that coerces manufacturers to enter into the Program, the possibility that first-choice drugs will not be readily approved where second-choice inferior alternatives exist concerns us."106 The District Court stated that the best interests of the patient would be hurt by prior authorization and it would therefore defeat the fundamental purposes of Medicaid law.107 There was testi mony on the record that when prior authorization is used inappropri ately, patients are hurt by increased delays, anxiety and confusion, and by the potential prescription of less safe and efficacious drugs.108 Fur thermore, although little empirical study has been done on the effects of prior authorization, existing empirical data strongly support PhRMA's argument.")9 Taken together, all these factors demonstrate the high likelihood that the Maine statute's use of prior authorization 1612, 1614 (1995) . The study examined NSAIDs that did not have a generic equivalent and were subject to prior authorization. Id. The study found that during the two years after prior authorization began, total expenditures for NSAIDs fell by $12.8 million compared to pro jections. Id. In addition, the study found no evidence of an increase in other related services and drugs. Id. This Section has demonstrated that under a purposive paradigm, with a view of the legislative history and circumstances in the states subsequent to enactment, Congress meant prior authorization to be used only in limited circumstances.111 The First Circuit, using a textual approach, failed to identify the limited purposes of the prior authori zation statute, and also failed to interpret the statute properly in order to harmonize it with the best interest requirement which undergirds the federal statute.112 Taking these factors into account, the Maine Program stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the aforemen tioned congressional purposes and therefore must be preempted.
This Section has shown that the purposive approach is superior to the textual framework in the context of Medicaid preemption because of the increased role of the judiciary in safeguarding the federalism concerns inherent in the statute. Under this purposive paradigm, the Maine Program must be preempted in light of the legislative history and subsequent state enactment reflecting the narrow purposes found in that legislative history. Pursuant to the congressional purposes, prior authorization does not stand as a leverage device used to extract rebates from pharmaceutical companies. Therefore, its misapplication stands as an obstacle to Congress's purposes and Medicaid's best in terest purposes.
B. A Delicate Balance Undone: The lmpermissibility of Cost Over Access "All interpretive theories must ultimately be grounded in a politi cal theory and a theory of law."m The notion of a purposivist frame work operating in a political vacuum is therefore both unrealistic and impossible. The appropriate political theory often depends on the na ture of the law at stake. In analyzing Medicaid, courts should adopt a delicate balance political theory because of the nature of the Medicaid program and because such a theory creates appropriate outer bounda ries to the purposive paradigm. Further, under a delicate balance the ory of law, the state prior authorization statutes must be preempted because they effectively unravel careful compromises over cost and access embodied in the legislation. 113. Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 31.
The delicate balance theory rests upon the idea that legislation is a package of compromises between various groups, and states should not be allowed to upset the political decisions made by Congress in ac commodating competing interests and interest groups.114 The case of International Paper Co. v. Ouellette115 illustrates this theory. The Court in Ouellette first noted that a "state law also is pre-empted if it inter feres with the methods by which the federal statute was designed to reach this goal."116 The Clean Water Act, the law at issue in Ouellette, carefully balanced public and private interests in attempting to elimi nate water pollution.117 The Court held that the Vermont law allowing common-law suits would upset this carefully crafted balance of inter ests at the federal level and therefore must be preempted.118 Thus, the Court recognized the balanced nature of the statute and deferred ac cordingly to that balance.
Three reasons demonstrate why this political theory is so attractive in the present case. First, Medicaid, much like the Clean Water Act, is a program that balances interests of different groups -doctors, re cipients, and pharmaceutical manufacturers -and balances compet ing goals -accessibility and cost-effectiveness.119 For exampl�, the federal rebate requirement serves as a quid pro quo to balance the pharmaceutical manufacturers' open access to state formularies, i.e., states' lists of covered drugs -an arrangement that protects and pre serves the interests of manufacturers, patients, and both federal and 117. Id. at 494. 118. Id. at 497 ("The CWA carefully defines the role of both the source and affected States, and specifically provides for a process whereby their interests will be considered and balanced by the source State and the EPA. This delineation of authority represents Con gress' considered judgment as to the best method of serving the public interest and recon ciling the often-competing concerns of those affected by the 'pollution. It would be extraor dinary for Congress, after devising an elaborate permit system that sets clear standards, to tolerate common-law suits that have the potential to undermine this regulatory structure."). [Vol. 101:602 state governments.120 Medicaid epitomizes the delicate balance theory of legislation.
Second, delicate balance theory guides courts in dealing with diffi cult issues of federalism in an area of complex federal/state relations. For example, in the case of Medicaid, the political history of the pro gram demonstrates the federal government's controlling position vis a-vis the states, thereby providing courts with the clear message that the federal balance of interests should be upheld.121 In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the federal government began to exert greater control in Medicaid and treat the states not as co-equals, but as subordinates to be commanded.122 In describing the Medicaid program as an exam ple of this new change in federal/state relations, one scholar notes: "Instead of relying upon the carrot of federal grants and conditions-of aid to gain state cooperation, the federal government has relied in creasingly upon sticks of various sorts, including legislative regulation, preemption, and judicial decrees."123 Even when Congress did give discretion to the states during this time, it did so in many cases with instructions of great specificity.124 If Congress demanded to be in the driver's seat in the promulgation of Medicaid requirements, then pre sumably it would also not want those provisions reflecting a delicate balance to be subverted by the states. Deference to federal interests via the delicate balance theory therefore recognizes Congress's intent to retain greater control in the realm of Medicaid.
Third, the delicate balance theory provides outer limits to protect against judicial lawmaking. The theory is based on the idea of law that the legislature forms legislation as a package of compromises and that the judiciary cannot interfere to destroy the package.125 Thus, the deli cate balance theory used in conjunction with purposivism serves as a balance within the jurisprudence. The purposivist judge proactively searches for statutory intent, yet the limits of the delicate balance theory prevent excessive judicial overreaching and the destruction of legislative will.126 The p. urposivist court looks to the purposes of the law, and if it sees legislation that seems to be indicative of a delicate balance, then it defers to that balance. Therefore, a delicate balance 121. GILMAN, supra note 65, at 105. 122. Id. 123. Id. 124. Id. at 115.
125. Wolfson, supra note 114, at 77.
126. See Aleinikoff, supra note 48, at 27 (noting that the objective of archeological mod els of interpretation is legislative supremacy); Jordan, supra note 39, at 1216-17 (recognizing that purposivism, as well as textualism, is wholly committed to the idea of legislative su premacy). theory may provide sound guidance for the purposivist judge who seeks to fulfill her role in safeguarding federalism while stopping short of legislating from the bench. Thus, the nature of the Medicaid pro gram, the creation of outer limits to prevent against judicial lawmak ing, and a recognition of Congress's purposeful superiority over the states in Medicaid all support the utilization of a delicate balance the ory in assessing a Medicaid preemption conflict.
Some opponents of the delicate balance theory, however, argue that it overlooks the fundamental premise of federalism that holds that there are two levels of legislative activity: federal and state.127 These critics continue by noting that a delicate balance theory does not necessarily evince an intent by Congress to preclude the states f r om altering the balance at their legislative level.128 If states were pre cluded from acting, the opponents argue, then "there would seem to be little if any room for state regulatory authority."129 The slippery slope is wet with the fear that the delicate balance theory may lead to the extreme centralization of government. Although a valid concern in the field of Medicaid, there are two responses to this contention.
First, the delicate balance theory would only preclude states from acting and upsetting federal interests where the legislation demonstrates a multi-interest, compromise nature. If states were allowed to subvert the balance in these types of laws, then there would be no reason for Congress to strike the balance in the first place.130 One could easily envision Congress washing its hands of formulating any legislation that involved a complex network of interests. Programs like Medicaid and the Clean Water Act would be subject to a patch work of varying state visions, and the uniformity found within these programs would be lost.
In addition, the theory would only amount to "minifield" preemp tion where Congress marks out a small part of a piece of legislation that represents a delicate balance and cannot be upset.131 For example, a court could conclude in the case of Medicaid that the provisions re lating to rebates and prior authorization132 represent a minifield that Congress completely occupies due to the balance of interests found in those subsections. Thus the states would be preempted from entering that field and changing those provisions. States would not be pre cluded from the whole field of Medicaid and the delicate balance con- [Vol. 101:602 sequently would work hand-in-hand with the management of federal ism.
In applying the delicate balance theory to the state prior authoriza tion statutes at issue, it becomes clear that the state laws upset the bal ance struck by Congress between accessibility of drugs provided by pharmaceutical manufacturers and cost-effectiveness realized by the states. By linking prior authorization to extracting supplemental re bates from pharmaceutical companies, states impermissibly decrease access to drugs and subvert the balance between access and expense mandated to the states in 1990. The mandatory rebates in the Medi caid statute were originally part of private voluntary pharmaceutical programs between pharmaceutical manufacturers and states.133 After many, but not all, states adopted the private program, Congress man dated in its Medicaid legislation that all fifty states adopt this program and thereby increase access to medicines through these rebates.134 Congress's incorporation of an originally voluntary state program into its federal law as a required program makes one thing clear: the method of rebating in order to improve access to prescription drugs is not optional.
When states leverage supplemental rebates out of drug companies by utilizing the threat of prior authorization, these states effectively turn a congressional mandate into something entirely discretionary. States could require exorbitant supplemental rebate amounts for cer tain drugs in order to limit access purposefully through the deterrent of prior authorization and thereby cut costs. The delicate balance be tween cost and access, consequently, would be destroyed. In order to maintain the delicate balance of interests in the federal legislation, the state prior authorization statutes must be preempted as running con trary to the purpose of Congress in tempering cost and open access to necessary prescription drugs for the poor.
Medicaid embodies a delicate balance of interests, and the state prior authorization statutes must be preempted in order to preserve that balance. As the First Circuit noted, "federal preemption of a state law is strong medicine, and is not casually to be dispensed."135 Al though the medicine is strong, it is clearly warranted in the present case. By using a purposive interpretive paradigm that is founded upon a delicate balance political theory, these state statutes must be deemed to be in implied conflict with Congress's purposes, and consequently preempted. Maine and several other states turned the rebate and prior authorization provisions in the federal law on their head. Congress, however, never intended prior authorization to be used as a bargain ing device to subvert the balanced interests in the legislation.
II. A S LEEPING G IANT A WAKENS: T HE D ORMANT C OMMERCE C LAUSE AND THE P RACTICAL E FFECTS OF P RIOR A UTHORIZATION S TATUTES
Resolution of the preemption question does not foreclose the con stitutional dilemma associated with prior authorization. Although pre emption remains dispositive, alternative grounds of attack remain in the form of the dormant commerce clause. A court managing to squirm around the preemptive qualities of the prior authorization statutes must still cross through the constitutional quagmire of the dormant commerce clause. This Part argues that such a task is impos sible because the state statutes clearly run afoul of the dormant com merce clause. Section II.A paves the way for the dormant commerce clause analysis by dismissing market participation as a viable defense for a state seeking refuge from a barrage of Commerce Clause attacks. Section II.B proceeds to argue that the state prior authorization stat utes are per se unconstitutional because they have an extraterritorial reach. Section II.C then argues in the alternative that even if the stat utes are upheld under an extraterritoriality test, they must be struck down under a balancing test since the burdens on interstate commerce outweigh the local benefits of the statutes.
A. A Word on Market Participation: The Easy Case
If a state is acting as a participant in the market and not as a regu lator, it may discriminate against out-of-state interests and be free from the constraints of the dormant commerce clause.136 The distinc tion between a regulator and a participant is often unclear;137 never theless, it is imperative to understand those differences in the present case to fully address the salient dormant commerce clause attacks. The case of the state prior authorization statutes, however, is an easy one. With regard to these statutes, the distinction is clear: the states' regula tion of drug prices through rebate provisions is an act of market regu lation and not market participation. Therefore, the states are not ex empt from dormant commerce clause violation.
Both the District Court of Maine's and the First Circuit's analysis on this point is instructive. Both courts held that under the Maine statute, Maine was acting as a market regulator. The market partici- 137. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 136, at 337-38.
[Vol. 101:602 pant doctrine governs the specific transaction.138 Under the Maine Program, it is the citizen who transacts and is considered the "payor" for the pharmaceuticals -the state of Maine never buys the prescrip tion drugs.139 The state is merely using its regulatory power in order to achieve the specific social goal of price reduction for its citizens.140 This is market regulation and not participation.141 Consequently, any de f e nse a state may raise through the invocation of the market partici pant doctrine must necessarily fail. The state prior authorization stat utes -Maine's being most illustrative -are a clear exercise of states' regulatory power. The dormant commerce clause's restrictions still apply and therefore extraterritoriality and balancing must still be ad dressed in turn. commerce clause jurisprudence145 and has declared that a state may not regulate commerce "that takes place wholly outside of the State's borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State."146 Thus, if a state projects its own legislation onto the regulatory schemes of other states, the statute is extraterritorial and per se unconstitu tional.147
B. Extraterritoriality and the Prohibition Against Legislative Projection
The principle of extraterritoriality comes to the forefront in the is sue of state prior authorization statutes. PhRMA argued and lost its extraterritorial challenge to the Maine Program before the First Circuit.148 Under closer inspection of the First Circuit's analysis, how ever, the court misapplied the principles of extraterritorialism. This Section critically examines the First Circuit's opinion and concludes that the Maine Program is unconstitutional under an extraterritorial Commerce Clause query. This Section begins by advancing the princi pal argument that the Maine Program impermissibly regulates conduct between pharmaceutical manufacturers and out-of-state wholesalers. Once the foundational argument is established, this Section then rec ognizes three justifications for upholding the Maine Program on extra territorial grounds and in turn refutes each of these justifications as being a misapplication of constitutional principles.
The state prior authorization statutes are unconstitutionally extra territorial because they regulate transactions that occur between out of-state manufacturers and out-of-state wholesalers. The state of Maine houses no drug manufacturers.149 Similarly, the vast majority of wholesalers -with only three exceptions -are located out-of state.150 The Maine Program, by "forcing" rebates upon manufacturers through the threat of prior authorization, in effect regulates the prices that these complying manufacturers charge their out-of-state whole- [Vol. 101:602 sale buyers.151 As the District Court declared, "Maine may have power over what pharmacists later do here in Maine, or over the few distribu tors who transact business in Maine, but it has no power to regulate the prices paid earlier in transactions in other states."152 The "practical effect"153 of the rebate is clear: manufacturers must sell their drugs at lower prices to wholesalers in order for those wholesalers to sell the prescription drugs in Maine at the rebated price level.154 Because these wholesalers and manufacturers all reside outside of Maine's borders, the Maine Program is entirely extraterritorial in its reach and there f o re unconstitutional.155
Three major counter-arguments, however, can be raised in an at tempt to uphold the statute on extraterritorial grounds. First, the Maine Program constitutionally regulates extraterritorial conduct be cause it does so by indirect means. Second, one can distinguish the primary extraterritorial cases as dealing with price control statutes, whereas the Maine Program is not a price control. Third, the rebate agreement in the Maine Program is voluntary and therefore the manu facturers are free to not participate and not be bound extraterritoriar ally. The First Circuit upheld the statute on extraterritorial grounds under these three justifications.156 Although all valid arguments, they are ultimately unpersuasive and will be refuted in tum. 153. Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 332 (1989) (stating that a "state law that has the 'practical effect' of regulating commerce occurring wholly outside that State's borders is in valid under the Commerce Clause").
154. This practical effect becomes more apparent given the fact that the rebate prices are below the pre-rebate wholesale prices, and thus manufacturers necessarily lose profits due to the adjustment of wholesale prices. See infra note 172 and accompanying text (dis cussing Maine's coercive tactics leading to lost profits).
155. The extraterritorial reach of the statute only applies to those transactions between out-of-state manufacturers and out-of-state wholesalers. Therefore, Maine still can constitu tionally regulate the limited number of transactions that involve one or more of the state's few wholesalers. Of course, Part I of this Note argues that such regulations would be invali dated on preemption grounds.
If Maine had any in-state manuf a cturers, the analysis potentially becomes a bit more complex. The physical location of the transaction -whether the sale occurred in the state of Maine or out-of-state -would determine constitutionality under the dormant commerce clause. The complexity arises in determining the exact location of transaction. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note 142, at 1874. trols on a transaction that occurs wholly out-of-state."157 The di rect/indirect rule states that a direct regulation is generally held to be per se unconstitutional whereas an indirect regulation is subject to a lower level of scrutiny via a balancing test. 158 Because the Maine Pro gram only regulates the out-of-state transactions between manufactur ers and wholesalers indirectly via the rebate provision, the law is not per se invalid. Although this probably was the First Circuit's strongest ground for upholding the statute, two arguments refute the primacy of the indirect/direct distinction.
Indirectness is not dispositive of extraterritorial scrutiny as it is only one of three major principles that govern extraterritorial analy sis.159 Only the second principle -"a statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State ... is in valid regardless of whether the statute's extraterritorial reach was in tended by the legislature"160 -makes reference to a direct control. The second principle also seems mostly to address motive review and the fact that a direct control would be subject to strict scrutiny even if legislative motive was pure. Furthermore, the first principle dealing with price scales (and not mentioning directness) seems most relevant to the Maine rebate statute at hand. Directness maintains a small place in the jurisprudence, but its primacy over the other principles and its use as a criterion for heightened scrutiny is unclear.161 From the explication of the other principles making no reference to directness, the inference is drawn that the strict scrutiny of extraterritorially does not depend upon the directness of the regulation, and alternative grounds exist to justify an indirect regulation.
Additionally, any direct/indirect test is mechanical and often re sults in inconsequential and arbitrary results.162 The key in extraterri- Vol. 101:602 torial cases is the fact that the state is projecting its regulatory scheme onto transactions outside of its boundaries. The direct/indirect distinc tion misses the point. In the case of the Maine Program, Maine does not deny that the practical effect of the statute is to reduce the prices of the drugs that out-of-state manufacturers sell to out-of-state dis tributors. The means of doing this -whether through direct regula tion of that transaction or through an indirect rebate affecting the eventual prices of the Medicaid drugs sold in Maine -are irrelevant. The means are irrelevant because the state will reach its end regard less of the directness of . the means.163 In fact, subverting principles of state interest for a mechanical directness test may undermine the very ideals of state sovereignty that extraterritorialism seeks to protect.164 The bottom line of extraterritorialism is not directness, but practical eff e cts. As the Supreme Court has reasoned, "the critical considera tion in determining whether the extraterritorial reach of a statute vio lates the Commerce Clause is the overall effect of the statute on both local and interstate commerce."165 The effects of a statute on state sov ereignty and national economy166 must have primacy over the me chanics and perversities of directness.
The second major justification for upholding the Maine Program is that the case law governing extraterritoriality deals with the impermis sibility of price controls and price affirmations.167 The First Circuit jus tified the statute by distinguishing the three cases that PhRMA relied upon168 as being cases about price affirmation and control and there fore unrelated to the Maine statute which "does not regulate the price of any out-of-state transaction, either by its express terms or by its in evitable effect."169 As opposed to the price control cases, Maine does not fix the prices of goods sold out-of-state and therefore does not af fect the commerce of its sister states.170
The problem with the First Circuit's treatment of the cases cited by PhRMA is that the distinction that the court drew is irrelevant. sale of drugs by manufacturers to wholesalers at a certain price.171 The crux of the argument is that in the case of explicit price affirmation and price controls, prices are pre-determined either at a fixed amount or against a fixed benchmark. This is not the case with regard to the Maine Program. Nonetheless, the First Circuit never elaborated why such a distinction is relevant, or why the price needs to be bench marked to a specific price in order to be extraterritorial.
In fact, the Maine rebate operates exactly as a price control. For example, if a manuf a cturer agrees to rebate its drug by ten percent, the inevitable effect is a ten percent reduction in the price paid to the manufacturer by the out-of-state wholesaler .given the reasonable as sumption that the wholesaler wants to maintain its profit margin.172 The First Circuit noted that the Maine law, unlike the affirmation and control statutes, does not tie the price of its in-state products to out-of state prices.173 But that is exactly what the statute does -it makes out of-state prices dependent on the in-state rebated sales. The First Circuit began its analysis by stating that the Maine Program does not regulate prices "either by its express terms or by its inevitable effect. "174 Yet the court glossed over the fact that the Maine Program, in effect, is a price control. Thus, its treatment of the price affirmation and control cases vis-a-vis the Maine Program was misguided.
The third major justification for upholding the statute deals with the voluntary and non-mutual nature of the rebate agreement. The First Circuit disposed of the extraterritorial challenge .on the grounds that the rebate agreement is voluntary and a decision to be bound by it is made freely by the manufacturer.175 The court went on to note that a manufacturer's choice to engage in the rebates and lose profits is not an extraterritorial regulation of profits, but rather a decision made by the manufacturer itself.176 The court did, however, recognize that the manufacturer's freedom of choice may become coercive depending upon the negotiation tactics used by the commissioner in extracting 171. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 81-82.
172. In other words, regulation of the final price in the sale by the wholesaler to the re tailer/recipients (a rebate under the Maine Program) will affect the price in the prior transac tion between manufacturer and wholesaler given the assumption that the wholesaler seeks to maintain present profit margin. In this way there is a relationship between both transactions. Vol. 101:602 rebates and therefore the issue could be revisited subsequent to im plementation.177
This "voluntary rationale" once again is a misapplication of consti tutional principle. Whether the choice to be bound to the statute is en tirely voluntary is not of consequence in assessing extraterritoriality. The freedom of choice or lack thereof to be bound by extraterritorial legislation does not in itself provide independent grounds for the con f e rral of extraterritorial jurisdiction.178 Thus, something is impermissi bly extraterritorial regardless of the mutuality of the party of con cern.179 The First Circuit failed to realize this point.180
In addition, the First Circuit's voluntary rationale -specifically its language concerning the voluntary aspects of a manufacturer's deci sion to forgo profits -is both overly formalistic and arbitrary. First, the court stated that the Maine law in no way regulated profits and that such a decision was strictly based on the manufacturer's own voli tion.181 This argument is overly formalistic in that it fails to take into account the effect of the rebate -the reduction of the manufacturer's profit margin. The court, in this same vein of formalism, attempted to justify its position by stating that the statutory language calls for "ne gotiating rebates" and not "regulating prices."182 The statute does in fact regulate profits, but it does so indirectly through the mechanism of the rebate.
Second, the court's discussion of the regulation of profits reflects an arbitrariness and a possible prejudice that drives the entire opinion.
Id.
178. Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note 142, at 1903. Professor Regan's discussion of Brown-Forman is instructive. lei. In Brown-Forman, the distiller cooperated in the creation of the New York law to be bound extraterritorially and affirm a set price as a quid pro quo for being able to do business in New York. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority, 476 U.S. 573, 575-76 (1986) . The distiller, much like the drug manu facturer in the present instance, remained "free" to abide by the price cap or simply to do no business in New York. Regan, Siamese Essays, supra note 142, at 1903. Regan compares Brown-Forman to the hypothetical of "Jones," an Illinois resident, who irrationally swears out an affidavit to be bound extraterritorially by Georgia's sodomy law; commits sodomy in Illinois in violation of the Georgia law; and then travels to Georgia. Id. at 1904. Georgia would not be able to prosecute Jones for something he did in Illinois. Id. Regan, comparing "Jones" and Brown-Forman, reaches the quite logical conclusion that "[i]f a free undertak ing to be bound by extraterritorial legislation, whether by Jones or by a distiller, does not confer extraterritorial jurisdiction, then it seems even clearer that the distiller's actual af firmation, which was to some degree compelled by the New York licensing agreements, should not grant extraterritorial jurisdiction." Id.
179. Presumably this would also render the First Circuit's concern for coercion by the state commissioner moot. If a law is extraterritorial regardless of the free choice of the chal lenging party, then the presence or absence of coercive tactics in no way changes the fact of its extraterritoriality. 
The court noted that the Commissioner's negotiation may become co ercive, and at that point in time, a challenge should be brought.183 Yet the court never addressed exactly at what point in time negotiation would equal coercion. The court's failure to set an objective standard of fairness to measure the level of coercion is potential for an arbitrary normative judgment.
The First Circuit's analysis in its totality perhaps reflects that such a standard of fairness will be biased against the pharmaceutical manu facturers.184 The court initially glossed over the "inevitable effect" principle of the extraterritorial inquiry most likely because it consid ered a loss of profits as being a voluntary action completely unrelated to the rebates.185 The court then created a formalistic and counter intuitive distinction between "negotiating rebates" and "regulating profits."186 Finally, the court declared that, at the nebulous point of co ercion, the issue of extraterritoriality may be reconsidered again; yet, the court never articulated what constitutes such a breaking point.187 These aspects of the opinion taken together lead to the inference of a possible prejudice that-the court may have held against pharmaceuti cal companies and the perception that such companies make excessive and unwarranted profits.
The Maine Program extraterritorially projects its regulation onto out-of-state transactions. Such a practice runs afoul of fundamental dormant commerce clause values. The First Circuit attempted to vali date the statute in light of its apparent deficiency · by distinguishing away the relevant price control cases, focusing upon the voluntariness of the statute, and utilizing the indirectness of the regulation as its savings clause. The First Circuit's analysis, however, was misguided. The statute is extraterritorial and per se unconstitutional.
C. Medicaid in the Balance: An Examination of Burdens and Benefits
The present dormant commerce clause inquiry should begii:i and end with extraterritoriality. Nevertheless, f o r the unpersuaded court that upholds the prior authorization statutes under an extraterritorial ity analysis, a lower level of scrutiny will still suffice to demonstrate a 183. Id. 
Id.
187. See id.
[Vol. 101:602 Commerce Clause violation in the present case.188 Traditionally, a court refusing an extraterritorial challenge applies a balancing test to the statute at hand.189 Under the balancing test, the statute will be up held "unless the burden imposed on [interstate] commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."190 In the present case, even under the lower level of scrutiny of the balancing test, the state statutes impose burdens on commerce that outweigh their bene fits and are therefore unconstitutional. By first evaluating the per ceived benefits of lower prescription drug prices for Medicaid recipi ents, such benefits become exposed as de minimus. Moreover, understanding that courts must weigh in the balance the loss of profits incurred by pharmaceutical manufacturers imposes a significant bur den on interstate commerce. Finally, under a Carotene Products analy sis,191 the balance must tip in favor of PhRMA because of its potential characterization as a group discriminated against in the political proc ess.
The benefit of lower prices to Medicaid recipients through the supplemental state rebates is small and should be given little weight in the balance. The First Circuit considered lower prices of prescription drugs and the consequent increased access to prescription drugs by the poor a "substantial" benefit.192 Two primary reasons cut against the value of lower prices as a putative local benefit. First, prescription drugs account for only ten percent of Medicaid spending.193 Thus, tar geting prescription drugs really will not provide substantial benefits relative to Medicaid spending in total.194 The degree of the benefit is 188. Because state prior authorization statutes clearly do not discriminate facially against out-of-staters, a balancing test, rather than strict scrutiny, applies. See Concannon, 249 F.3d at 83; Phelps, supra note 141, at 262. 190. Id. The language "clearly excessive" implies more than a mere mathematical for mula, but rather a legal standard conditional on degree. See id. ("If a legitimate local pur pose is found, then the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities."). Second, the benefits of lower prices for the poor in the short-run may be a burden to these recipients and to consumers at large in the long-run. The current federal rebate program is structured to make sure manufacturers sell their Medicaid drugs at a minimum of 15.1 % off of the manufacturer's average price -with many of the discounts exceeding the 15.1 % level.195 This ensures that the manufacturers are not overcharging, but rather selling at below-market prices.196 Working under this assumption that drug companies are selling their products to Medicaid recipients at below-market levels already, by further in creasing that discount via state supplemental rebates, drug companies will have greater incentive to both decrease sales197 to Medicaid recipi ents and slow research and development of life-saving pipeline drugs.198 Thus, the price benefit to Medicaid recipients today may pre vent them from obtaining the necessary medications of tomorrow. In this light, the substantial benefit of lower drug prices loses its value.
Proponents of state statutes like the Maine's contend that lower prices will be off-set by volume increases and thus the effects on re search and development are exaggerated and illusory. As a Merrill that CBO issued in 1993 projected that the federal government and the states together would spend $1.6 trillion on Medicaid from 1994 to 2000."). Medicines are the most cost-effective form of medical therapy because they help to reduce the cost of alternative, more expensive forms of medical care, such as surgery or hospitalization."); Mezrich, supra note 194, at 135 ("[H)igh pharmaceuti cal costs still actually save money, because a good medicine tends to keep patients out of hospitals or eliminate the need for surgery or other therapies which may cost much more than even the most expensive drug.").
[ Vol. 101:602 Lynch report indicated, "Volume increases could overwhelm negative pricing impact .... On a worst-case basis we believe the top-line im pact could be negative 6 percent if all Medicare recipients had access to drugs at a 40 percent discount to the manufacturer's price.m99 At only a negative six percent clip, drug manufacturers would not have to dip into their research and development funds in order to finance re bated sales.200
This argument, although reassuring in part, fails to recognize that the drug industry is a risky, long-term business. Volume increases on existing drugs may keep the industry alive, but continuous annual loss projections must be accounted f or now and affect the development of drugs that could potentially reach market years from now.201 By limit ing profits of the successful drugs, research and development will nec essarily decline.202 The limitation by state rebate statutes, of course, is added to the already 15.1 % minimum federal rebate to create an un manageable obstacle to research and development.203 One health care policy analyst, in discussing a comparable price rebate scheme for Medicare,204 characterized the nature of the drug industry and the ef fect of such a rebate as follows:
Pharmaceutical research is a very risky business. A number of independ ent studies have found that between 5,000 and 10,000 compounds are tried on average for every 1 that makes it into a neighborhood pharmacy.
And that one may be for a very tiny niche market. The incentive to en gage in such intense research and development is the potential for large profits on the few drugs that are successful. If the government limited profits on the successes, then there would be fewer resources devoted to research and development. This would translate into a reduced likeli hood that tomorrow's cures will be developed. Last year, U.S. The argument that present-day volume increases mitigate price impact does not fully take into account the long-term and risk-based nature of the drug industry. Any excessive price impact -no matter how seemingly minimal -must be founded on an understanding of the opposite: the industry's profitability is within 1 % of its real cos t of capital. Stanton, supra note 199, at 156 ("The common denominator by which to compare profit levels among dis parate industries is to measure their internal rate of return (IRR). In a study comparing in ternal rates of return from 1959 to 1973 among major industries, pharmaceuticals averaged 12.9% IRR, while chemicals averaged 9.1 %, petroleum averaged 10.8%, and the average across all industries was 9.6%. More contemporary analyses have been done on the pharma ceutical industry alone, finding an IRR of 11.1 % against the industry's average real cost of capital of 10.5%. Thus the pharmaceutical industry's profitability is .within 1 % of its real cost of capital, clearly not an excessive level of profitability."). Thus, a supplemental state rebate compounded with the federal rebate will hinder research and development insofar as high profitability cannot cover those losses. (2000) ("Thus, given the high costs and risks associated with 'drug research, companies must rely on a lim ited number of highly successful products to finance their continuing R&D.").
(Vol. 101 :602 the long-term projections206 that manufacturers make and the poten tially resultant billion dollar decreases in research and development that could ensue.207 This is a detriment to the consumer, to society in general, and to the Medicaid recipient which militates against the value of lower prices. Lower prices may be a benefit to Medicaid re cipients at first glance. The benefit, however, is severely undermined by taking note of prescription drugs' small role in Medicaid vis-a-vis the long-term repercussions on research and development.208 In this light, the benefit must therefore be tempered when weighing it against the burdens on interstate commerce.
In relation to the small benefits behind the statute, the burdens on interstate commerce are significant. The most significant burden on interstate commerce by the state prior authorization statutes is the economic devastation in the form of lost profits to manufacturers.209 Consequently, any balancing test must take into account the profits that manufacturers will lose due to the state regulation because of the burdensome effects of such losses on the interstate prescription drug market. The First Circuit in balancing the effects of the Maine statute, however, refused to place these lost profits in the balance. 207. See Daniels, supra note 197, at B7 ("Drug research is probably the riskiest eco nomic venture we know; only one of 5,000 possibilities researched ever becomes a marketed product."); see also Mezrich, supra note 194, at 136 n.37 (noting the "inherent risk and ex pense of R&D" and recounting the real possibility of a U.S. pharmaceutical corporation "expending billions on R&D [and failing] to recoup their investment and end(ing] up bank rupt").
208. See supra notes 193-207 and accompanying text. 209. Phann. Research & Mfrs. of Am v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 84 (1st Cir. 2001 ) (discussing the effect of lost profits on interstate commerce). 210. Id. 211. 874 F.2d 926 (3rd Cir. 1989 ).
212. Concannon, 249 F.3d at 84 (internal quotations omitted). In addition, the First Circuit noted the difficulty of weighing the possible effects -including the potential loss of profits -instead of the actual effects of the statute. This seems to be more of a criticism of the use of a balancing test in general rather than a separate justification for the court's fail ure to consider lost profits (actual or possible). The court's recognition of the difficulties in foreseeing the future is understandable. Nonetheless, the court's task requires such a prog nosticative role under the balancing test employed in dormant commerce clause jurispru dence for effects are not always visible and quantifiable upon first inspection. In any event, this Note treats the First Circuit's complaint as separate from its refusal to balance lost prof its and therefore does not consider it in the discussion of devastating economic conse quences. For a general criticism of balancing, see Regan, supra note 42.
Motor, the Third Circuit's rule does not apply in the present case for two reasons.
First, Fo rd Motor invalidated the use of lost profits in the balance because of the plaintiffs' impure motives in that case -an impurity missing in the state prior authorization statutes. The Third Circuit stated that the plaintiff companies213 in that case could not "hope to invoke the Constitution at every tum to circumvent state regulation and insure unrestricted expansion and protection of their opportunity to obtain the greatest margin of profit."214 The court, in effect, utilized a type of motive review215 and saw evidence of greedy corporate plain tiffs who were seeking to break and circumvent the law for their own gain.216 Consequently, this sort of "unclean hands" analysis must be seen as driving the Third Ciicuit's rationale in excluding profits.217
Regardless of the validity of such analysis, in the case of state prior authorization laws, manufacturers do not have this same impure mo tive. The manufacturers already rebate their drugs below market-level pursuant to the federal rebate provisions.218 Furthermore, as afore mentioned, the federal rebate program started on the manuf acturers'
213. The two plaintiffs were Ford Motor Company and United States Automobile Association. Each plaintiff had a wholly independent and separate case, but the cases were consolidated on appeal because of the factual and legal commonalities. Ford Motor Co. , 874 F.2d at 929. 214. Id. at 944.
215. This should not be confused with the traditional meaning of motive review -a re view of the legislative motives behind the passage of legislation -which is quite coinciden tally employed frequently in assessing dormant commerce clause cases. See Regan, supra note 42, at 1143 -1160 see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) 216. Plaintiffs were holding companies who acquired numerous savings and loan com panies and their subsidiaries. Plaintiffs already owned various subsidiaries that were in the business of selling insurance. Through the expansion of their corporate endeavors into the realm of savings and loans, plaintiffs -with malice aforethought -were in clear violation of a Pennsylvania statute prohibiting savings and loan companies from providing insurance in that state. Ford Motor Co., 874 F.2d at 929-31. Thus, from the facts of the case, the court may have inferred that plaintiffs' widespread expansion, with the knowledge that such ex pansion would place them in violation of Pennsylvania law, was an attempt to have their cake and eat it too.
217. In fact, the Third Circuit began its analysis with a caveat that rather than drawing attention away from the normative judgment it was making, simply placed a purposefully thin veil over what was quite apparent. The court initially cautioned: "[The plaintiffs' corpo rate] strategy is their own choosing and we express no value judgments concerning it." Ford Motor Co. , 874 F.2d at 943. Yet the court then proceeded to make those very value judg ments by characterizing the companies as ones engaged in "unrestricted expansion" and seeking "the greatest margin of profit." Id. Whether or not the court intended to poorly mask the value judgments it later made is uncertain. Nonetheless, a close reading of Ford Motor reveals motive review of plaintiffs' actions. own initiative.219 This is strong evidence that the pharmaceutical manufacturers' motive is not entirely profit-seeking in nature. The concern manufacturers have with state rebate statutes is that they are excessive and may compromise the companies' abilities to research and to develop new drugs -the lifeline of the drug industry.220 Be cause Fo rd Motor employs an "unclean hands" analysis as a criterion for disregarding lost profits, the rule of Fo rd Motor should not apply to the pharmaceutical companies whose motives in the context of Medicaid are more self-preserving than self-serving.221
The second distinction between Fo rd Motor and the present case is the difference between interstate insurance and interstate pharmaceu tical markets. The Third Circuit relied upon Exxon Corporation v. Governor of Maryland222 in its analysis of the use of lost profits.223 The Supreme Court in Exxon reasoned that because the Commerce Clause protects the interstate market and not particular interstate firms from burdensome regulations, the central inquiry is into the effects upon the market.224 This is not to say that lost profits cannot affect the inter state market and therefore gain relevancy. The Third Circuit recog nized this salient point and characterized the Maryland market in Exxon as one rich with an availability of substitutes; if refiners with drew from the market, other interstate refiners would easily replace them and thus the regulation would place no burden upon interstate commerce.225 Similarly, the Third Circuit found in Fo rd Motor that if the plaintiffs decided to leave the Pennsylvania market due to a de crease in profits caused by the regulation, other interstate insurers would take their place in the Pennsylvania market, and the burden would be placed not on the interstate market, but only on the exiting firms.226 Conversely, it follows that an absence of replacements for the 221. In examining the key differences between plaintiffs' motives in Fo rd Motor and the present case, two additional points are noteworthy. First, in Fo rd Motor, 874 F.2d at 921-31, the plaintiffs expanded their corporate endeavors into a completely new realm. See supra note 216. The pharmaceutical manufacturers never altered their course of dealing. Second, in Ford Motor, the statute was on the books and plaintiffs, with knowledge of the law, made conscious business decisions to violate the statute. Id. The Maine Program was enacted long after the pharmaceutical manufacturers had entered the Maine market. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Thus, in the case of PhRMA, the manufacturers never engaged in the same "unrestricted expansion" {change in business) designed to "circumvent state regu lation" (with prior knowledge of the state statute) that the Third Circuit abhorred and con sidered unclean. exiting firms would burden interstate commerce, thereby making the lost profits -and their effects on the market -a relevant item to be balanced.
The pharmaceutical market operates with much less opportunity for substitute goods than the insurance market found in Ford Motor, and the lack of replacements in the pharmaceutical market thus forces a court to balance lost profits. Research-based drug manufacturers have patent protection over their innovative prescription drugs for a number of years.227 Thus, if a manufacturer were to leave the Maine market because of Maine's rebate provision and take its drug with it, then presumably no one could replace that drug on the market due to its patent protection. Although generic manufacturers may manufac ture such drugs once the patents expire,228 generic manufacturers do not serve as adequate replacements as far as Medicaid is concerned. The most highly-sought after drugs by Medicaid recipients are the newer, cutting-edge medications -drugs presumably not yet off pat ent.229 Due to patent protection,230 the pharmaceutical market for each prescription drug not off patent is monopolistic and therefore not re- [Vol. 101 :602 placeable by other interstate firms.231 This lack of substitution in the pharmaceutical market distinguishes it from the Fo rd Motor market.232
Lost profits by pharmaceutical manufacturers and those profits' ef fects upon the interstate market must be weighed in a dormant com merce clause balancing test. Lost profits from the state rebate laws can produce potentially devastating economic damage to the prescription drug market by forcing manufacturers out of the market and leaving no adequate replacement products.233 Medicaid patients would be left without necessary drugs, or manufacturers would remain and sell re bated drugs at a significant loss, eating away at research and develop ment and future drug development.234 Both scenarios are unacceptable and reflect the significant burden of lost profits that the prior authori zation statutes impose upon interstate commerce.235 These losses rep resent a serious burden to interstate commerce and tip the balance against the state statutes.236
231. Quick Guide to Intellectual Property, at http:/linnovation.phrma.org/studyguides/ intellpropertyguide.phtml (last visited Dec. 4, 2002) ("Patents are the legal protection for inventions, including new medicines discovered by research-based pharmaceutical compa nies. A patent in the United States, as in most developed nations and many developing coun tries, is a grant from the government to the inventor that essentially gives him or her the ex clusive right to use and sell the invention for a defined number of years. At the heart of the patent is the corresponding right to exclude others from making, using and selling the inven tion.").
232. This analysis is more relevant for those pharmaceuticals without therapeutic substi tutes and, as aforementioned, generally inapplicable to those drugs off-patent. & ECON. 311, 312 (2000 ) ("Generic market shares of off-patent products are significantly higher in countries that permit (relatively) free pricing, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany, than in countries with strict price or reimburse ment regulation, such as France, Italy, and Japan."). 235. In fact, the first scenario -Medicaid patients left without necessary drugs -is al ready a reality. In response to the Michigan prior authorization statute, six of the world's largest drug companies entered into a collusive boycott by refusing to rebate their drugs un der the Michigan statute. Gold et al., supra note 11 (reporting that the six boycotting com panies are "Eli Lilly & Co., Indianapolis; Johnson & Johnson, New Brunswick, N.J.; Merck; Pfizer; Pharmacia Corp., Peapack, N.J.; and Wyeth-Ayerst Laboratories, the prescription drug unit of American Home Products Corp., Madison, N.J."). Boycotts such as these illus trate the long-term ramifications of prior authorization insofar as manufacturers are willing to give up present market share presumably in order to curb a long-term economically dev astating scheme. Id. Further, consider the potential for similar boycotts in light of the fact that numerous other states and even private health insurance companies plan on imple menting similar prior authorization programs. Id.; see also Maine Appeals Halt on its R.x Plan, supra note 26 (stating that roughly twenty-eight other states are planning to introduce legislation similar to Maine's).
236.
A critical inquiry in dormant commerce clause cases -specifically in the case of extraterritorial statutes -is "what effect would arise if not one, but many or every, State adopted similar legislation." Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1998). Presumably if lost Finally, the state prior authorization statutes fail under a balancing test because the burdens on interstate commerce are magnified when one recognizes PhRMA as a politically discriminated against group that deserves judicial protection.237 This argument is a variation on a theme238 first expressed in famous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Company.239 At first glance, considering PhRMA -a group that accounts for more than 75 percent of brand-name drug sales in the United States240 -a "discrete and insular"241 group seems counterintuitive. Yet rather than focusing upon the "discrete and inprofits are considered in light of this principle, then the burden greatly increases in degree, and any "possible effects" become much more real and even inevitable.
237. Courts in general should consider the political processes in a dormant commerce clause query. Although political concerns are not traditionally an item to be placed into the burden/benefit balance, a court's concern with preserving political processes shows the moti vating factor behind the inquiry and consequently serves as the primary justification to bal ance in the first place. See Regan, supra note 42, at 1166 (noting the traditional Carolene Products scholar's argument that the Carotene Products dormant commerce clause theory provides the justification for balancing). For example, if a court were to determine that the purpose of the dormant commerce clause is to prohibit protectionism, then the decision to balance and everything within the balance would be viewed through anti-protectionist glasses. Regan advocates the primacy of protectionism (yet by no means endorses balanc ing). Id. Similarly, if a court were to consider protecting the politically under-represented as a principal dormant commerce clause concern, a court would use its discretion in weighing the balance in order to tip in favor of the under-represented. Thus, the glasses that the court wears will help give meaning to the items already placed on the scales. To put it another way, it may be much more important to choose the right balance than to choose the right items of measure. (Of course, the added meaning of a political theory is also pertinent in an extraterritorial analysis. Due to the large discretion in a balancing test, however, a court may be able to better serve its purposes in this context rather than in an extraterritorial settinga reason why the political analysis js discussed here and not earlier).
The political process balance is one of great significance as far as the dormant commerce clause is concerned mainly because it is a political theory that can solve the federal-state and separation-of-powers problems inherent in dormant commerce clause cases. See Mark Tushnet, Rethinking The Dormant Commerce Clause, 1979 WIS. L. REV. 125, 164-65. This becomes especially pertinent in the present case because of federalism's special role in Medicaid. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text. Thus, in choosing the appropriate balance, the political process balance must be given strong consideration.
238. The variation is based on Professor Bruce Ackerman's view of Carolene Products. Professor Ackerman eschews the "discrete and insular" language of Carotene Products and argues that the true focus in examining political dysfunction should be on those groups that are prejudiced, regardless of their discreteness or insularity. Bruce Ackerman, Beyond Carotene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985) .
239. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition ... curtail[ing] the operation of those political processes ordinar ily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and [so] may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."). 241. The terms "discrete" and "insular" are probably open to differing and controversial meanings. This Note, however, adopts the sensible sociological definitions advanced by Pro fessor Ackerman. Thus, "insularity" describes the "tendency of group members to interact with great frequency in a variety of social contexts." Ackerman, supra note 238, at 726. A group is considered "discrete" "when its members are marked out in ways that make it rela tively easy for others to identify them." Id. at 729.
(Vol. 101:602 sular" language of Carolene Products, PhRMA deserves protection as justified by the language in the footnote protecting those who languish under the burden of prejudice. PhRMA is a group prejudiced against in the political processes and therefore should be judicially pro tected. 242 Rather than attempt to suggest that PhRMA possesses the characteristics of either a discrete or insular group, this Note argues that the reasoning behind Carotene Products does not stand for the protection only of the discrete and insular, but also of "politically inef fective majorities." As PhRMA is one such ineff e ctive group, it de serves the special attention of the court.243
The "prejudice" language of Carolene Products is sometimes ig nored to the detriment of the under-represented.244 Therefore, politi cally ineffective majorities that feel the impact of society's prejudice and are ineffective because of this prejudice, often find themselves without a voice in the formulation of laws that affect them.245 If Carolene Products is truly concerned with political dysfunction, then it is the disdain for prejudice which should serve to protect both the "dif fuse and anonymous" as well as the "insular and discrete."246 As one scholar queries, "Why should the concern with . 'prejudice' justify Carolene's narrow fixation upon 'discrete and insular' minorities?"247 Simply put, it should not.248 If a group is ineff e ctive in the legislative 242. See infra notes 249-250, 254. 243. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (arguing for special judicial attention for prejudiced groups); Ackerman, supra note 238.
244. Ackerman, supra note 238, at 731 ("Carotene's empirical inadequacy stems from its underinclusive conception of the impact of prejudice upon American society."). 248. See ELY, supra note 243, at 153 {noting that prejudice properly addresses the un constitutional motivations of the legislature, whereas discreteness and insularity do not).
Insularity and discreteness may even be advantageous in the political arena, especially relative to those prejudiced against. As Professor Ackerman posits, the problem with the language of Carotene Products is that it "disdains the easy case in its eagerness to pronounce on harder ones." Ackerman, supra note 238, at 722-23. Insular and discrete groups normally have tremendous bargaining advantages, id. at 723-24, and thus to offer protection to such groups was a bold and broad stroke by the Court. The bargaining advantages of an insular and discrete group come in the form of increased political resources and lower organiza tional costs relative to an anonymous and diffuse group. Id. at 726. As Professor Ackerman explains, insularity "will help breed sentiments of group solidarity." Id. at 725. Thus, a group that possesses solidarity is more likely to make symbolic contributions for political purposes. Id. Moreover, a group's insularity can easily lead to the exposure of non-contributing free riders and thereby increase resources by curbing free-riding. Id. In way of organizational costs, insular groups have pre-existing channels of communication and therefore find it cheaper to organize. Id. at 726. Similarly, a discrete group -due to the ease of recognition of members -will find it cheaper and easier to organize. Id. at 730-31; see also ELY, supra note 243, at 157-60.
The absence of language supporting "the easy cases," however, does not foreclose appli cation of the principle to those cases. An observation of the case law concludes that Carotene Products is more concerned with political weakness propagated by attacks on egalitarianism forum due to widespread and systematic prejudice, then that groupmore than any other -must be protected under the spirit of Carolene Products.
PhRMA is a victim of prejudice and should thus be protected in the political processes. The portrayal of drug companies as "evil" and "profit-seeking" by members of the media and even high-ranking po litical leaders249 has seemingly undermined their political power. 250 Although it is difficult to examine the motives of and influences upon the enacting state legislatures,251 the mere evidence of widespread so cietal prejudice against drug companies gives rise to the inference of unconstitutional, prejudicial motivations behind the state prior authorization statutes.252 Moreover, a mere inference would be ample to justify a more searching judicial inquiry under Carolene Products. 253 The inference is further strengthened by PhRMA's ineffectiveness in preventing the passage of the Maine Program in spite of its strenuous than with the weakness of the single insular group. Ackerman, supra note 238, at 723. The opportunity for all to equally participate in the political processes, and not the nature of the group denied participation, is at the core of Carotene Products. See ELY, supra note 243, at 77 (arguing that the focus of Carotene Products is "whether the opportunity to participate either in the political processes by which values are appropriately identified and accommo dated, or in the accommodation those processes have reached, has been unduly con stricted").
[Vol. 101:602 lobbying efforts and organizational advantages.254 Ultimately, the in ference of prejudice -an inference based on vociferous anti-PhRMA statements by political leaders and a war-like rhetoric by media and grass-roots groups against the drug industry255 -seems strong enough to be of concern to a Carolene Products court. Therefore, at the very least, the prejudice factor should be considered in a balancing test and should tip in favor of PhRMA in order to preserve the talismanic po litical processes.
Under a balancing test that measures the burdens and benefits of a state law on interstate commerce, the state statutes must be struck down as unconstitutional. The perceived local benefits of lower prices for Medicaid recipients are not of great significance. In fact, these benefits may actually serve to undermine pharmaceutical research and development and thus hurt these same consumers in the future. Moreover, the burdens of potential lost profits by manufacturers on the interstate market militate against upholding the statutes. Finally, the more searching judicial inquiry of a revised Carotene Products theory suggests protection of PhRMA as an ineffective and persecuted interest group within the political processes. This protection is the fi nal constitutional determinate in tipping the balance and demonstrat ing the excessive burden of the state statutes relative to the statutes' minimal benefits.
C ONCLUSION
This Note concludes that state prior authorization statutes run con trary to the congressional intent behind prior authorization -an in tent that clearly calls for the use of prior authorization to curb unnec essary over-prescription. By utilizing a purposive interpretive theory, 254. PhRMA, for example, waged a vociferous advertising campaign in Maine protest ing the Maine Program, yet the law passed quite easily. See Page, supra note 198. In general, PhRMA has been unsuccessful in its lobbying efforts recently despite the expenditure of vast sums of money. For example, in 1999, the pharmaceutical industry was Washington's top lobbying spender, yet it failed to achieve its primary goal of obtaining a tax credit for re search and development. congressional intent becomes more apparent in light of the greater le gal context of Medicaid. Therefore, federal law must preempt such statutes.
Moreover, this Note demonstrates that state prior authorization statutes violate the dormant commerce clause as being extraterritorial regulations, as well as failing under a balancing test where the burdens on commerce are excessive in relation to the local benefits. Although not a traditional Carolene Products group, PhRMA never received a fair shake in the hostile and prejudiced political arena which gave birth to the Maine Program. With the judicial concern for advancing fair representation of prejudiced and ineffective groups in the political f o ra in mind, the excessiveness of the burdens upon interstate com merce becomes evident. Due to the constitutional limitations upon state prior authorization statutes, they cannot serve as appropriate legislative means to further the interests of Medicaid and its recipients.
The Maine Program is a regulatory scheme with a noble ideal. Yet in its efforts to further the interests of its Medicaid recipients, Maine undermines the interests of all. Maine's program is not only unconsti tutional, but it also hinders health care and restricts long-term phar maceutical research and development. The Supreme Court now awaits to settle this dispute. At stake could be the future of health care in this country as we know it.
